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Security Councils Have Feelings, Too: Applying an Old Tool in a New Setting Can Help Bridge the Research-Practice Gap in Arctic Geopolitics

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**Security Councils Have Feelings, Too: Applying
an Old Tool in a New Setting Can Help Bridge the
Research-Practice Gap in Arctic Geopolitics**

By

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Security Councils Have Feelings, Too: Applying an Old Tool in a New Setting Can Help Bridge the Research-Practice Gap in Arctic Geopolitics

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Arctic geopolitics involve a number of unique and complicated factors. Not only are larger historical dynamics at play, but polic-makers are also struggling with new technological advancements and their impact on day-to-day interactions that shape policy. This paper works towards a more predictive theory for Arctic Geopolitics by applying Edgar Schein's Model of Organizational Culture and Leadership to US and Russian national security bodies. By doing so, the paper argues that national security professionals can better understand themselves and their foreign counterparts, and that knowledge will help them to strategize and problem solve in the years ahead.

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Introduction

Why does the Arctic geopolitical environment look the way that it does? Ask 1,000 experts and you'll get 1,000 different explanations. Ask one set of Arctic national security panelists at the 2019 *Halifax International Security Forum* and you'll come away with a sense that the correct answer isn't coming from Dr. Thomas Axworthy.

The *Halifax International Security Forum* is an annual meeting of policy professionals and experts who come together each year in Halifax, Ontario, to discuss national security threats expected in the upcoming year. The forum's plenary session The End of the World: The Arctic, was framed by an academic paper from Dr. Thomas Axworthy questioning the efficacy of Canada's recently-released Arctic strategy.

The paper pointed out that Canada had not provided a strategy at all, as it contained "neither an implementation plan nor concrete policy choices" on how to address the country's well-known issues, but those of Russia and China did.¹ He then compared the Canadian government's headway on addressing its national security challenges to that of the Chinese and Russian governments, respectively. He was clearly asking why Canadian national security professionals were neglecting what he considered to be an important piece of Canada's national security strategy: a well-thought out national security strategy. His question: what role does a national security strategy play in addressing national security issues?

The panelists, who were all public servants, military personnel and decision makers, paid no mind to Axworthy's paper or central question. They spent the time discussing their own views and experiences, even when asked by the moderator **Word did not find any entries for your table of contents.** or to discuss their thoughts on the paper. Only one panelist, retired Canadian Major General Tammy Harris, commented on the

¹ Thomas Axworthy, "The End of the World: The Arctic," The 2019 Halifax International Security Forum, <https://halifaxtheforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019HP-Axworthy.pdf>.

paper, and her response was a defense Canada's strategy document. She described the Arctic as a "harsh environment" in need of specialized equipment, infrastructure, and expensive technologies, concluding that with so many aspirations and pushes for action, "it just doesn't always happen."²

This example demonstrates how much uncertainty and complexity is involved in Arctic geopolitical discourse. In an effort to help clarify that discourse and possibly restore a sense of predictability to events in the region, this paper asks, *What processes do national security bodies use to create national security policies?* I argue that while each body uses a different process to craft national security policies, Edgar Schein's Model of Organizational Culture and Leadership from corporate communications theory can successfully yield insights into those processes in a way that improves predictability in Arctic geopolitics.

A Region in Flux

In recent years, the Arctic as a geographical area rose to one of the premier national security priorities for an increasing number of countries. The increased attention puts pressure on conflicts and unsolved problems, the old and the new. Russian President Vladimir Putin put it well when he described the Arctic as "a concentration of practically all aspects of national security – military, political, economic, technological, environmental and that of resources."³ Alongside these more traditional national security considerations are the new realities brought on by an increasingly interconnected and globalized world, including strategic inertia, isolationism, reactivity, the 24-hour news cycle, and shortsightedness.

² Video Recording: 2019 Halifax International Security Forum. Plenary Session 2 The End of the World: The Arctic. <https://halifaxtheforum.org/forum/2019-halifax-international-security-forum/saturday-november-23/#agenda>, minute 9:30.

³ "Заседание Совета Безопасности По Вопросу Реализации Государственной Политики в Арктике," *Президент России*, 22 Apr. 2014, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20845.

Dr. Jeremi Suri writes in his recent book, *The Impossible Presidency*, that the current approach to policy making leaves top decision makers under tremendous pressure to react immediately to the most pressing crisis. This leaves “little space for thought and creativity about policy, or much of anything else.”⁴ Part of this tremendous pressure has to do with the rapid advancement of technology and the “tyranny of the news cycle” has been described as one of the most disruptive realities for strategic planning in the U.S. National Security Council, specifically.⁵

It is in this space of chaos, pressure, and a never-ending deluge of crises that the U.S. National Security Council has found itself trapped. The body responsible for U.S. national security, the National Security Council, has mostly considered defensive national security concerns in the Arctic, but has still struggled to articulate the specific work to be done in its national security strategies. As a result, onlookers frequently complain that opportunities to address major challenges in the Arctic have instead become platforms for U.S. leaders to spout “clichés and empty political phrases about freedom and innovation.”⁶

The result, for US national security stance towards the Arctic, is a static narrative about the types of national security concerns to be found there: that China and Russia pose a grave existential threat to the free world and the U.S. must be prepared to defend against an attack from them at a moment’s notice.⁷

The result of this narrative is a policy approach that emphasizes general military building-ups in the Arctic and a fixation on defending natural resources claims.⁸ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo transformed a speech on the economic potential of the Arctic into a melodrama in which he “cast the Arctic as simply the setting for a three-way struggle in

⁴ Jeremi Suri, *The Impossible Presidency*, Hatchette Book Group, New York (2017), 289.

⁵ David J. Rothkopf, *Running the World: the inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, Public Affairs, 2006: 458.

⁶ Dermot Cole, “How a Myopic View of the Arctic Hampers US Policy,” *The Arctic Today*, October 20, 2019. <https://www.arctictoday.com/how-a-myopic-view-of-the-arctic-hampers-u-s-policy/>.

⁷ Jacquelyn Chorus, “Prepared to go Fully Kinetic.”

⁸ Michael Pompeo, “Looking North.”

which the United States, Russia and China find themselves wrestling for regional supremacy.”⁹

While there is no clear description of what precise threats that China and Russia pose, there is also no plan to address the non-military challenges in the Arctic. Russia has made strides in increasing its Arctic shipping capacity and has even been surpassing its own strategic objectives in the region.¹⁰ China has deeply entrenched itself into the Arctic space despite being a non-Arctic state.

Observers note that “China’s conservative approach to developing an Arctic strategy has been successful, as the country is now widely viewed as a significant Arctic player after only a few short years of intensive regional engagement.”¹¹ U.S. national security leaders continue to dismiss the importance of non-military Arctic development, as well as the strategic, non-military footholds of Russian and Chinese rivals.

Many Arctic littoral states have also been eagerly preparing themselves for the economic boon expected in the near future, as well as considering the environmental consequences of climate change. The anticipation is so great that it has fanned the flames of succession amongst Greenlanders who seek independence from Denmark. An article from the economist entitled, “Chinese investment may help Greenland become independent from Denmark,” explains how the economic opportunities of a melting Arctic are changing the calculus of Greenlanders and could ultimately change the layout of the map.¹²

The region is clearly in flux. The various dimensions and opportunities for U.S. involvement continue to multiply, but eventually those windows will close and new

⁹ Cole, “How a Myopic View.”

¹⁰ Charles Digges, “Russia releases massive official plans for the Northern Sea Route,” Bellona.org, January 9 2020, <https://bellona.org/news/arctic/2020-01-russia-releases-massive-official-plans-for-the-northern-sea-route>.

¹¹ Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Emerging Strategies in the Arctic,” *The High North News*, April 24, 2019 <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/chinas-emerging-strategies-arctic>.

¹² “Chinese investment may help Greenland become independent from Denmark,” *The Economist*: May 3 2018 edition, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/05/03/chinese-investment-may-help-greenland-become-independent-from-denmark>.

geopolitical power structures will ossify. At that time, the chance for U.S. leaders to secure the country a powerful, enduring national security position in the Arctic will significantly decline. By the time that everything else in the region becomes locked in, the U.S. may be locked out.

Where IR Theory Falls Short in the Arctic

International relations theories exist to help simplify a complex world, offering a sense of predictability and order. But unfortunately, the Arctic, in particular, provides an especially difficult case for these theories.

Theories of each individual school (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) are poorly suited to the Arctic context. One example of this is the threat of climate change in the Arctic, which realist theory would not currently be able to conceptualize. Threats to the international system, from a realist perspective, come directly from the presence of accumulated military power. Realism is designed to deal with kinetic military threats posed by other states, not existential threats to human civilization. Realism generally predicts that failing to project superior military power will invite a military confrontation from Russia and/or China.

Many of these predictions clash entirely with the predictions of liberalism in the Arctic. Liberalism emphasizes opportunities for cooperation and mutually beneficial trade, suggesting that economic interconnectedness will reduce the possibility of armed conflict.

And then there is Constructivism, a less popular but growing school of thought, which focuses more on how unique cultural perspectives help to shape political relationships in the region and is far less prescriptive. Such theories would be inherently less relevant to national security decision makers because without a concrete structure, it suggests that everything to do with human behavior impacts the international system to some degree. And if everything is important, nothing is.

IR theory is also plagued by another issue: it tends to classify variables as either a one or a zero. There is not a range for anarchy in the international system, there is not a range for miscalculations or democracy. There is not a range for statehood, even if some states appear more stable than others. In IR theory, often times something either is or is not—it is an all or nothing binary. But we also know that national security professionals spend a great deal of time trying to assess these very variables.

In some instances, predictions from one school of thought prove correct. In other instances, they do not. What experts and veterans in the field have generally noted is that no one school of thought holds all of the answers, and instead a familiarity with all is important.

Without more prescriptive and reliable theories, policy makers and academics are forced to jump back and forth from past to present trying to either align the current variables with past variables to make direct policy suggestions, or they are creating Frankenstein policies that combine variables from various historic events. The more there is to consider, the less IR theory is able to keep up.

As a result, there is a growing gap between theory and practice in international relations, leading a number of experts to conclude that IR theory is irrelevant. One of IR theory's harshest critics, author of the recent book The Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security Michael C. Desch, argues that the gap has been widening for decades, and academic work on national security now has a very minor influence on actual policy decisions.

Competing predictions, rising complexity, and general uncertainty about the future do not lend much to U.S. policymakers aside from fueling a chaotic atmosphere of apprehension, fear and excitement—an atmosphere where lots of words are said but few decisions actually get made. Experts are missing a compelling process to generate recommendations that policy makers are more readily able to act on.

While each school of thought helps to illuminate a different dimension of Arctic geopolitical relationships, when it comes to crafting policy there is no set structure for considering them alongside one another. Unfortunately, when good judgment is the best tool and there is too much information to ever feel informed, policy makers find themselves stretched too thin to think clearly and commit to a comprehensive strategy.

How National Security Bodies Operate

Understanding how a model from organizational communications theory might apply to national security bodies better than IR theories requires a brief overview of the role national security interests serve in the international realm.

Regardless of a country's model of government, a single government body generally handles critical decisions on state survival. In Russia and the United States, the top national leaders and advisors are members of that body. While special interests and non-governmental actors may indirectly influence national security policies, those policies ultimately come from this closed circle of people.

There are elements of realist theory involved in how national security bodies function. An interest in survival, the central motivator of realist theory, is the key variable in national security matters. Fear is instinctive, and it is universal. It has a profound influence on human behavior. Non-state actors like multinational corporations and international organizations, major actors in liberal theory, create powerful additional pressures.

Their priorities often relate to the accumulation of material value and political power, respectively, both of which relate directly to a sense of control. It is no coincidence that liberal theory emphasizes cooperation and integration for mutual benefit as a method for reducing conflict. These powerful restraints on acceptable state behaviors naturally influences national security policy. And especially when it comes to national security, we cannot discount the influence of identity.

The Problems

The U.S. National Security Council has a structure for crafting national security strategy that makes indecisiveness, and the resulting absence of a clear strategy, difficult to avoid. The security dimensions in the Arctic are also too vast and too complex for current approaches to IR theory to offer many holistic, realistic recommendations. A widely recognized gap between IR theory and practice makes it even more difficult to formulate a coherent Arctic strategy—a mechanism that should enhance efficiency is currently out of alignment.

Without that added guidance, policy professionals must depend more heavily on their own judgment. In as complex a region as the Arctic, this can translate into trying to reinvent the wheel each time they make a policy decision. It also makes them much more vulnerable to criticism. These circumstances mean that they are even less willing to take firm policy stances. Mounting domestic pressures further reduce policy options.

This paper seeks to define the unique decision-making structure of the U.S. National Security Council and how that structure influences its Arctic policies. The National Security Council does not make decisions in a vacuum. Instead, its members rely on consistent geopolitical frameworks and face the same recurring policy limitations and red tape. Understanding this decision-making structure is a critical first step in overcoming the problems that have hindered efforts to undertake urgent and important work.

The products that the US National Security Council provides are leadership, policy, economic opportunity, and influence. But there are broad limitations on the types of national security “products” that the council can provide. Organizational communications theory has been grappling with similar problems brought on by globalization and international integration for some time.

Reactivity relates to “adaptability” in organizational communications theory, which refers to how well an organization adapts to constant and unpredictable disruptions. The 24-hour news cycle burdens the National Security Council in very similar ways to how it burdens private organizations. Shortsightedness is a consequence of that reactivity — constantly working in triage is a distraction from the big picture considerations.

The intended “product” is warped by factors both within and outside of the United States. “The impulse among American voters is for swift, dramatic, emotionally satisfying solutions to the issues of the day. But most issues require long, time-consuming, complex, expensive commitments.”¹³ They also have “expectations for rapid achievements” but current issues are “too diffuse and difficult for any single leader to integrate them in a coherent narrative.”¹⁴ This makes it all the more difficult to move forward and achieve successes that the general public deems satisfying.

The problems are patterns of behavior and thought that sometimes steer policy in suboptimal directions. A first step is to understand those patterns and how they exist and function in the US National Security Council, and then to show that by revealing important characteristics of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation, and then showing how, given this information, the US is missing out on major opportunities to advance towards national security priorities in the Arctic.

IR theory does not offer a methodology suitable for the research question: *What processes do national security bodies use to create national security policies?* Instead of choosing between realism, liberalism, or constructivism as a methodological lens, this thesis will explore the question using Edgar Schein’s *Model of Organizational Culture and Leadership*, a well-regarded model from organizational communications theory that has been rigorously tested in the private sector.

This thesis will apply Schein’s model to better understand decision making processes in the US and Russian Security Councils and consider if the results yield a

¹³ Rothkopf, *Running the World*, 459.

¹⁴ Suri, *The Impossible Presidency*, 289.

better understanding of their respective Arctic policies. The rest of this thesis will be divided into five chapters: the methodology, a case study on the U.S. National Security Council, a case study on the Security Council of the Russian Federation, application of these case studies to explain Arctic developments, and the conclusions.

Methodology

From the standpoint of a national security professional, making national security decisions involves two general steps. The first is determining the desired policy outcome, and the second is determining how to best achieve the desired policy outcome. Step one is about accuracy and step two is about feasibility. The national security problem that this paper seeks to address deals more with the second step—feasibility. Barriers in the form of the 24-hour news cycle, reactivity, etc., make it more difficult to go from desired outcomes to real outcomes.

But in as high stakes a game as national security, fear and time pressures lead to a default response: prepare for anything and everything. And as mentioned previously, that is not strategy. That is triage, and never allows for more than responding to short-term needs. Larger and recurring issues are neglected—only to once again become a top priority when a crisis emerges.

How to Conceptualize this Phenomenon

Theories often include an “error term” acknowledging that since theories offer simplified views of the world, they do not always offer a perfect description of reality. An error term in national security matters and strategic thinking appears in Carl Von Clausewitz’s writings on *friction* in his classic text On War.

This thesis will categorize that error term as “entropy.” Entropy is a physics term referring to a measure of the unavailable energy in a closed system, or “a measure of the system’s disorder.”¹⁵ At its most basic, “entropy” suggests that less is more; the less you have going on, the more energy and attention you have readily available to devote elsewhere. The concept of “entropy” offers a useful way to conceptualize the complex

¹⁵ Gordon W.F. Drake, “Entropy,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 7 June 2018, www.britannica.com/science/entropy-physics.

reality that decision-makers face because it implies that there is a zero-sum element to the time and resources that policy makers have at their disposal. Each expenditure implies an opportunity cost, and every issue commands precious attention.

The result is an equation representing the decision-making process, but in a way that sees the final outcome as the interaction of a target goal with the confines of reality:

Real Policy outcome = Perfect Policy Outcome (0) + the final entropy value (n)

The entropy value is higher when many things are happening and is lower when the system quiets down. The goal of a state is survival, and the method for this is maintaining control—reducing entropy. If a state has total control and behaves purely on its survival instincts, then we would expect the entropy value to approach zero. The lower the entropy, the more effectively the national security body can function in the interest of national security. Realism is most predictive when entropy is low. But the more entropy there is in the system, the more complex the system becomes and the more we must consider liberalism and constructivism in how national security bodies behave.

Entropy encompasses the miscalculations, the entire world of actors, the cultural influences, etc. Entropy includes fear, economic interests, and identity, and anything else that is relevant. Anything that could possibly factor into a national security body making process would contribute to its entropy level. And the entropy level is always in flux.

This conceptualization of national security policy can help explain why the Arctic is proving so difficult to manage. It is in flux, there are so many moving parts, and as a result the entropy value is higher. The Arctic geopolitical environment becomes more difficult to predict. That means security policy becomes more convoluted. This is in part a product of unique characteristics of the physical Arctic environment, but also has a lot to do with increasing levels of globalization.

Each characteristic of the current geopolitical environment can be understood as a source of entropy: understandings of global dynamics, larger historical forces that apply pressure, transition periods, the difficulty in separating short and long-term concerns, deep human bias that projects past experience even if it leads to misguided conclusions.

The entropy value is very high, and national security professionals are working around the clock to minimize it. But professionals have struggled to successfully manage the common national security barriers (24-hour news cycle, reactivity, etc.), which are all contributing to the high final entropy value. When national security strategists weigh the importance of realism, liberalism, constructivism, context, history, etc., what they are actually doing is trying to identify and account for these burgeoning sources of entropy.

Thinking of international relations in this way, what national security strategists would most benefit from is a tool that helps them identify, prioritize, and manage primary sources of entropy. This means taking several steps backwards from the question of *Why does Arctic geopolitics look the way that it does?* and instead asking *How can we better understand the behavior of national security bodies?* That requires the researcher to looking for patterns that help increase a sense of predictability about these organizations.

Corporate Communications Theory Can Identify Patterns in these Processes

When it comes to social science fields with a minimal gap between theory and practice, corporate communications and organizational cultures looks particularly promising because practice is heavily informed by the research. There are connections to be drawn between how political and corporate institutions function in the international realm and strategize to meet goals.

Because “feasibility” considerations have more to do with how organizations behave and what they value, as opposed to actual national security concerns, insight into these patterns of identity and culture will be important. Dr. Edgar Schein’s *Model of*

Organizational Culture and Leadership is designed to uncover the unique and largely hidden characters of organizations. By examining the organization and discerning its unique cultural signature (or “cultural DNA”), Schein believes organizations will be more able to implement positive changes and become better suited for accomplishing their goals.¹⁶

This means that instead of offering policy prescriptions that work in theory, the model would help provide a tailored analysis of how the organization functions and what criteria a policy suggestion must meet in order to click into place. Approaching the problem from this angle provides a new avenue for hope that it is possible to bridge the growing gap between theory and practice.

What Edgar Schein’ Model Says

Schein’s model is used to better understand the processes organizations use to meet their goals, identify cultural maladaptions that interfere with those processes, and ultimately offer suggestions for how to change or eliminate the cultural maladaptations. According to Schein, culture is a:

“pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.”¹⁷

Schein’s model also instructs the researcher to look at the influence of the *macroculture*, or the general cultural environment in which the organization must navigate in order to survive. The macro-culture is the culture in which the particular

¹⁶ Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New Jersey (2017): 5th Edition, 7.

¹⁷ Katherine Miller, *Organizational Communication: Approaches and Processes*, Cengage Learning/Wadsworth, 2015: 89.

organization is embedded and must function, and as Schein explains, they can be “nations, occupations, or large organizations.”¹⁸

While Schein's theory allows us to focus on whatever body is vested with the power to make national security decisions, there are also important elements of liberal ideology that can function in this space. Schein allows us to take into account how other internal and external considerations factor into decision making, changing its calculus from one that entirely focuses on gut survival instinct.

If nuances matter, then we need to incorporate them into the theory. Patterns of competing interests matter if they are shaping policy. Last but not least, constructivism, which focuses on culture but has been too overwhelming for policymakers, fits into Schein's work, but he offers a more holistic method for turning complex dynamics into bite-size chunks, but in a way that allows us to consider the theories in a more holistic sense.

Schein's model suggests that evidence of the organizational culture can be found at three distinct, yet interconnected, levels: 1) cultural artifacts, 2) espoused values, and 3) tacit assumptions. *Cultural artifacts* tend to include tangible items and items produced by the organization. These artifacts produced by national security bodies would include policies, reports, speeches, autobiographies of former members, and books written by strategists and national security professionals.

Artifacts reveal an organization's *espoused values*—what the organization stands for, seeks to achieve, and aspires to be. Common national security values include ensuring safety, economic prosperity, freedom, and protection for the country.

When there is a firm understanding of the artifacts and espoused values, and how they function in the organization, one can begin to understand the less obvious beliefs held by organizational members—what Schein refers to as “tacit assumptions.”

¹⁸ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3.

Tacit assumptions can be completely invisible to outsiders, and insiders are also often not fully aware of them or how they influence the organization. Tacit assumptions can yield the greatest insights because they are often more deterministic of how the organization behaves than any other level. These tacit assumptions, while they may relate to the organization's goals, also may not. They could stem from the unique culture itself and may be poorly adapted for reaching organizational goals.

The three levels, in tandem, tell us who the organization is—its unique cultural DNA. Schein defines cultural DNA as: “the beliefs, values, and desired behaviors that launched the group and made it successful. This early level of beliefs, values and desired behavior becomes nonnegotiable and turns into taken-for-granted basic assumptions that subsequently drop out of awareness...culture-change programs can work only if they are consistent with the group's cultural DNA.” Schein argues that in order for a leader to successfully execute institutional change, the changes must be consistent with the organization's unique cultural DNA.

Instead of devoting time and attention to *culture content*, or the infinite cultural artifacts that national security professionals' overload themselves with, professionals can look instead at the far more manageable and predictable *cultural structure*. Uncovering the cultural structure requires an organized approach to evaluating culture content. Schein identifies 12 culture content areas. They are:

1. **Observable behavior when people interact.** Schein describes the observable behaviors as “the language [members] use along with the regularities in the interaction... observed interaction patterns, customs, and traditions become evident in all groups in a variety of situations.” This factor is constituted by the most obvious, surface level codes of conduct between the institutional members. Careful attention helps to reveal unique dynamics between group members, offering more detailed insight into how these individuals process information and make decisions.

2. **Climate.** Schein describes this factor as the “feeling that is conveyed in a group by the physical layout and the way in which members of the organization interact with each other, with customers, or with other outsiders.” What are the physical aspects of the environments in which the group makes decisions? What tone exists in the interactions between members, or between the group and outsiders? Does the institution conduct meetings in a towering, inaccessible government building? Or in a more humble meeting space that allows for visitors and is highly visible? What does this communicate about how the institution sees itself and its relationship to the outside world?

3. **Formal rituals and celebrations.** This factor is captured in “the ways in which a group celebrates key events that reflect important values or important “passages” by members such as promotion, completion of important projects, and milestones.” How do these institutions celebrate their successes? Are such rituals communicated to the outside world, or are they are more private affair? What special privileges do they convey to their members?

4. **Espoused Values.** These are “the articulated, publicly announced principles and values that the group claims to be trying to achieve.” In the corporate world, they are such things as “product quality,” “price leadership, or “safety.” In the policy world, they might manifest as “freedom” or “democracy” or “economic prosperity.” These values are often articulated in such things as autobiographies and recruiting materials. They are also geared towards the populations that the institutions must serve. They help create a vision of what the government seeks to provide for its citizens, and articulate what the quality of life in the respective country should look like.

5. **Formal Philosophy.** These are “the broad policies and ideological principles that guide a group’s actions toward stockholders, employees, customers, and other

stakeholders.” When applied to a policy world, a formal philosophy would be communicated towards such things as France’s long held motto “liberty, equality, fraternity.” This differs from espoused values because it is more uniquely tailored to a specific macro-culture. While espoused values can be widely shared, formal philosophies set out a more detailed, unique vision.

6. **Group norms.** Schein describes group norms as “the implicit standards and values that evolve in working groups, such as the particular norm of ‘a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay.’” These may be norms about preparedness—such as expectations that all group members read the morning paper before appearing together so that they are on the same page about current events. These can be longstanding norms within the institution, or they can vary with the group membership.

7. **Rules of the game.** Here, Schein refers to “the implicit, unwritten rules for getting along in the organization.” This can be something like “never give the boss bad news.” From this factor, an organization can enter into maladaptive patterns such as “groupthink.” Such rules can shed light on who has the most decision-making authority within the group, even if it is not aligned with the structural design of the institution.

8. **Identity and images of self.** This refers to “how the organization views itself in terms of ‘who we are,’ ‘what is our purpose,’ and ‘how we do things.’ Does this organization see itself as a proud hero of the people? A champion of the underdogs? A mediator between powerful, often conflicting forces? This can be based in the history of the macro-culture, but also evolved from the history of the institution itself.

9. **Embedded skills.** Schein describes this factor as “the special competencies displayed by group members in accomplishing certain tasks, the ability to make certain

things that get passed on from generation to generation without necessarily being articulated in writing.” These “skills” may be directly linked with macro-cultures. Leaders may be able to harness these skills by tapping into the macro-culture and understanding from past leaders how best to navigate the unique policy environment.

10. Habits of thinking, mental models, or linguistic paradigms. These are “the shared cognitive frames that guide the perceptions, thoughts, and language used by the members of a group and are taught to new members in the socialization or “onboarding” process.” How do members of the group talk about their roles, or describe the outside world? This is connected to factor 8, Identity and Image of Self, yet it refers to the processes and channels through which views of self and the outside world are established. What lenses are the members looking through as they attempt to describe themselves and others? What are their conceptions of other institutions and cultures with which they interact?

11. Shared Meanings. Schein explains this as “the emergent understandings that are created by group member as they interact with each other where the same words used in different cultures can have very different meanings.” For example, although each institution may refer regularly to “national security,” this term may have developed very different meanings in each cultural context. It is important to understand precisely what values, goals, and threats mean in each context.

12. Root metaphors or integrating symbols. Schein describes this factor as “the ways that groups evolve to characterize themselves, which may or may not be appreciated consciously but become embodied in buildings, office lay-outs, and other material artifacts of the group. This level of the culture reflects the emotional and aesthetic response of members as contrasted with the cognitive or evaluative response.”

This stems more from the basic assumptions, which draw from the history behind each institution. These metaphors and symbols will be deeply entrenched and can yield powerful insights into the basic assumptions guiding the group.

Acknowledging that it would be overwhelming to thoroughly explore all twelve of the culture content areas, Schein discourages using them as a formal checklist.¹⁹ He makes this point clear, leaving it up to the "personal needs and interests" of the researcher, whose discretion will guide the process.²⁰

An organization's unique cultural structure is enduring. That is what we are looking for.

A Case for Schein's Model

Schein's *Model of Organizational Communication and Leadership* provides a clearly defined tool for identifying patterns of behavior through elements of the scientific method. Schein explains that in order for the results to be valid, it must be replicable, predictable, and acceptable to members of the organization.²¹ Results satisfying this validity criteria, especially the "acceptability" factor, would be a godsend for national security professionals, who struggle to find research recommendations that actually sound like realistic options.

If this model can help to explain how the primary actors in the national security realm behave, it may become easier to anticipate their behavior. If we can get closer to solving problems, and those solutions bring us closer to making more accurate predictions, then academics should no longer resign themselves to the idea that the IR gap cannot be bridged. It will establish this paper as directly relevant to the work of national security professionals.

¹⁹ Ibid., 256.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 262.

Experts can pinpoint specific problems at much lower levels, but still have not been able to articulate clearly how those problems can be translated into solutions. Some things, like the NSC's tendency to be reactive, seem easy enough to fix. Enough smart people both within and outside of the institution have recognized the issue. So why haven't policy makers been able to free themselves? Schein's theory can help us understand how cultural DNA, which is influenced by societal pressures, can make it more difficult for the national security professionals to cope with overwhelming levels of entropy. His model is also about how leaders can make organizational changes to improve functioning and reduce entropy levels.

Professionals and academics also use the model to better understand the cultural DNA of other governments, and based on that information they can have a more structured way of understanding incoming data. They can do this by using Schein's explanations of an organization's *manifest* and *latent* functions. While manifest functions are made explicitly clear by organizational leadership, latent functions are not and may even be destructive to the organization if voiced.²² Still, the two must be harmonized if the group's identity is to survive.

This helps to explain why political leaders are often forced into seemingly contradictory behaviors. This can also help to explain why political leaders may be pushed into inefficient, detrimental decisions. They encounter dissonance between manifest and latent functions and must struggle to harmonize the two. The manifest function for a national security institution is survival, in its purest form. Latent functions have to do with the unique culture under which these institutions function, and which sometimes pressure the organization to behave in ways that are inconsistent with its manifest function. Latent functions are the entropy patterns.

Schein's model focuses on the main actors, the bodies that determine national security policy, but also allows the researcher to look at sources of entropy that stem from

²² Ibid., 153.

the macro-culture. National security bodies have a close connection to the country at large, from which it originated. They are connected by a social contract, of sorts. They serve and are bound by one another.

How Schein's Model Will Be Applied

National security goals and objectives will be explored through Schein's distinction between an organization's *manifest* and *latent* functions. Manifest functions are easy to spot because they are regularly put on display. They are embedded in mission statements and appear explicitly on documents, in speeches, and in other forms of communication produced by the organizations. The divergence between the manifest functions and what the organization actually does reveals clues as to what the latent functions might be. The first step is to examine the available culture content, guided by the list of culture content areas, and identify any major discrepancies.

While thoroughly covering all 12 of Schein's categories would be ideal, it is too much for the scope of this project. Therefore, the two case study chapters applying Schein's model will each focus on five of these 12. The five will be selected based off of background knowledge on each institution and what five categories seem most exemplified in how the organization functions. Schein does say that it is up to the discretion of the researcher to decide categories to emphasize. He explains that the selection of content areas has to do with the most striking elements of the organization, as observed by the researcher.²³

While the US NCS and SCRF case studies will differ in some respects, they will both look at:

1. Legislation that establishes, regulates, and redefines national security duties
2. National security doctrines

²³ Ibid.

The definition of national security is subject to interpretation, and I argue that when it comes to governments, the concept is defined culturally long before a national security body is formed. Since both the US and Russian Federation define their governments from respective constitutions and legal systems, their respective national security bodies were established through legislation. This legislation will contain information from the various content areas. It will also make clear exactly what national security problems the body was established to address, and can also reveal assumptions in how duties are defined and carried out.

Doctrines, or uniquely tailored sets of national security principles, provide justification for decisions or policy philosophies. They help to engage the public, both domestically and internationally, in national security conversations. In order to succeed, they must provide compelling narratives and can provide snapshots of the fears, symbols, and other identity markers used to communicate with the macro culture. Doctrines signal that something has changed in how the body plans to approach its national security goals. These shifts must be consistent with the cultural DNA of the NSC, but also with the macrocultural DNA.

Doctrines are also important because by creating narratives of national security, they define and redefine what national security means. They create evolutions of the definition of national security—making them tools to manage macrocultural change. That is why the US NSC chapter will reach back centuries into the history of the US to identify the original national security meanings and values.

While the doctrine section of the US NSC case study is organized around well-known doctrines, the doctrine section of the SCRF will break down Russian President Vladimir Putin's leadership into three stages: his rise, his doctrinal shift in 2012, and his behavior following that shift. This is because leadership turnover rates in the US NSC and SCRF

differ significantly, and the age of the two countries differs significantly. These two considerations influence how I've chosen to approach both sections.

The US NSC Culture Content Areas will be:

- #4 Espoused Values
- #5 Formal Philosophies
- #8 Identity and Images of Self
- #10 Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms
- #11 Shared Meanings

The SCRF Culture Content Areas will be:

- #4 Espoused Values
- #5 Formal Philosophies
- #8 Identity and Images of Self
- #9 Embedded Skills
- #10 Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms

The Arctic chapter will take the cultural DNA from both national security bodies and see if they carry any retrospective explanatory power in the Arctic.

The Conclusions chapter will use the model to make predictions for the future, along with recommendations.

The National Security Council of the United States

This chapter is about the internal sources of entropy for the National Security Council (NSC) of the United States. It begins with five sections (outlined below) and concludes with a synthesis of the important behavioral patterns that they suggest—the cultural DNA.²⁴

The pieces of legislation and national security doctrines examined in this chapter are:

- 1) The National Security Act of 1947
- 2) The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
- 3) The Monroe Doctrine
- 4) The Truman Doctrine
- 5) The Reagan Doctrine

Each piece will be explored in the form of an immersive narrative, offering a full contextual understanding. This NSC case study, therefore, will look for patterns and discrepancies amongst five major events that are presented as brief snapshots in time.

The Monroe Doctrine is the first major foreign policy doctrine in U.S. history, and has had a lasting influence on U.S. foreign policy, and the Roosevelt Corollary shows how foreign engagement principles shifted once the U.S. attained the status of a “Great Power.” The Truman Doctrine coincided with the National Security Act of 1947 and

²⁴ Portions of this section have been previously published as Jacquelyn Andrea Chorush, “‘Prepared to Go Fully Kinetic’: How U.S. Leaders Conceptualize China's Threat to Arctic Security,” *The Arctic Institute*, 16 June 2020, www.thearcticinstitute.org/prepared-kinetic-us-leaders-conceptualize-china-threat-arctic-security/.

provides an added layer of understanding to the critical pivot in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-making. The Reagan Doctrine coincides with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and provides added insight, as well. The Bush Doctrine reveals more on how the U.S. national security council sought to adapt itself to a drastic increase in entropy: globalization, the digital age, and the threat of terrorism and non-state actors.

The content areas I will devote my attention to are: Espoused Values; Formal Philosophies; Identity and Images of Self; Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms; Shared Meanings. I expect to find inconsistencies between within and amongst the content areas.

The final section pieces together an outline of how US NSC culture influences its policies, demonstrating the impact of long-held biases regarding itself, the country, and democracy.

1. Legislation Defining the NSC and its Duties

The National Security Act of 1947

The United States was already 171 years old when the *National Security Act of 1947* established the National Security Council. A U.S. national security apparatus had existed when the country was founded, but the act formalized it, a more defined structure and set of duties. While the NSC was a major development, its establishment was not the primary objective that U.S. leaders and policymakers had in mind. They crafted the legislation to address three problems that were logistical and theoretical in nature. World War Two had a profound impact on national security priorities and structures. The war exposed unclear lines of communication in U.S. defense structures, disorganization of the U.S. national security apparatus, and directly resulted in a major shift in IR discourse pertaining to understandings of U.S national security threats.

U.S. domestic institutions were proven inefficient and ill equipped, structurally, to deal with the complexities of fighting a war. Rothkopf explains “Of particular importance was learning from the experiences of the Second World War to ensure that we could balance our political and diplomatic interests and capabilities with our military and intelligence interests and capabilities.”²⁵ One of the major bureaucratic weaknesses was that role responsibilities and communication channels in place for the war effort were poorly defined. Roosevelt unintentionally brought this to light, in part, with his style of organizational leadership. Since there was no clear chain of command to ensure that all major decisions crossed Roosevelt’s desk, he used his position of authority to rig the system in his favor. He intentionally made his bureaucracy chaotic and dysfunctional so that “important decisions were always passed on to the top,” which he believed would keep “ambitious men” from selfishly taking decision making authority on matters that he expected to be involved in.²⁶

But Roosevelt’s system was a major headache for those who worked under him, and added to the general sense of panic and frenzy that accompanied the war effort.²⁷ President Truman, along with “others in government who had seen the consequences of Roosevelt’s management style and determined that something needed to be done so that should the U.S. ever again face similar crises, the system of government would ensure a better process, capturing the views of more of the best minds available before decisions were to be made.”²⁸ They wanted to ensure that in the future, U.S. defense structures would be adequately adapted to deal with major conflicts.

The second problem, which gave particular haste to the legislation, was that U.S. leaders already suspected that a new conflict was brewing with the Soviet Union. From

²⁵ David J. Rothkopf, *Running the World: the inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, Public Affairs (2006), 28.

²⁶ Ibid, 34.

²⁷ Ibid, 35.

²⁸ Ibid.

the 1930s to the 1940s, the IR discipline underwent a profound shift from favoring ‘idealism’ to favoring ‘realism.’ Idealists, now commonly referred to as liberals, dominated the IR discourse after the First World War and believed that international cooperation would prevent future wars. But that school of thought was thrown into a “scientific crisis” on the eve of the Second World War.²⁹ The shift “was triggered by a number of ‘real world’ events—Manchuria, Abyssinia, the failure of the League, Munich, and the slide into war—but most importantly by the publication of E. H. Carr’s *The Twenty Year’s Crisis*.”³⁰

At the time his work was published in 1939, “realism, Carr’s alternative scientific standpoint [to idealism], offered not only a cogent explanation, but also the prospect of accurate prediction and effective policy prescription. It soon replaced idealism as the ‘normal science’ of the field.”³¹ Carr shifted the dialogue by arguing that war was always a possibility, and thus the task was in predicting when war could be expected to occur. To support his point, Carr explained that “Clausewitz’s famous aphorism that ‘war is nothing but the continuation of political relations by other means’ has been repeated with approval both by Lenin and by the Communist International; and Hitler meant much the same thing when he said that ‘an alliance whose object does not include the intention to fight is meaningless and useless’.”³² Carr’s fascination with Soviet Russia and Marxism is apparent throughout *The Twenty Year’s Crisis*, although the degree to which this influenced U.S. policy makers to view the Soviet Union as a major threat to U.S. national security is unclear.

The third problem, which was a direct result of the second problem, was that the United States chose a drastically more involved foreign policy position, which pivoted

²⁹ Peter Wilson, “The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate,’” *Review of international studies* 24, no. 5 (December 1998).

³⁰ Ibid, 1.

³¹ Ibid.

³² E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939*, (1945): 102.

towards a permanently more involved international presence, in anticipation of future conflicts. Thus, demands on U.S. institutions would be even more strained under the weight of their burgeoning responsibilities. There was an added need to design more robust, sophisticated foreign policy and defensive structures to protect the United States, along with the free world it sought to create, from those who sought to destroy them.

The result of this new approach was a flourishing of foreign policy institutions and government structures. According to Rothkopf, in the aftermath of World War II, the United States developed powerful international institutions, as well as much needed domestic institutions to help address the increasingly complex global environment.³³ One of these institutions is the National Security Council, which was established by the National Security Act of 1947.

While the National Security Act of 1947 was primarily focused on restructuring the U.S. Department of Defense and creating the CIA—two areas that deal directly with preventing catastrophe—it also created the National Security Council to solve structural issues surrounding the President. It established a number of agencies, positions, and procedures, and provided authorization for infinite others. This is remarkable considering that the document itself has fewer than 20 pages and was passed within two years of the end of the war.

As written in the original Act of 1947:

“The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.”³⁴

But the legislation did something else with regards to the National Security Council. Informed by the shift in IR theory, drafters embedded realist understandings of national security into the structure and mandate of the council. Title I, which establishes

³³ David J. Rothkopf, *Running the World*, 28.

³⁴ *The National Security Act of 1947*.

the National Security Council, is roughly a page—quite brief for the enduring body that it created—and this is because the issue was conceptualized in a way that was simple and straightforward. Following from the assumption that certain aggressive countries are always seeking out opportunities for war, the purpose of the National Security Council is clearly designed to be a hyper vigilant body that is in a perpetual race to prepare the country for war.

The document reads that as directed by the President, the Council's duty would be *“to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith.”*³⁵ These references to “actual” and “potential” military power are drawn directly from realist understandings of national security, and possibly were taken directly from Carr himself.

In his book, Carr explains that “potential war” is the normal state of the international system, and because of that military power is the true political goal of states.³⁶ Thus, under this conceptualization of national security, “potential” military power refers to any form of non-military capital, including economic power or public support, that at any moment can be translated into military power.

Following from this, it would be implied that “objectives, commitments, and risks” would all have to do with actual and potential military power. And the responsibility for identifying and addressing these three central components of national security would fall to the National Security Council and Department of Defense.

Towards the end of Title I, there is a reference to potential future uses of the council. The Council “shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, 102.

other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.”³⁷ The vague and flexible nature of this responsibility reflects a lack of understanding, on part of the lawmakers, of what exactly the council would need to do in order to effectively serve U.S. national security interests. It is also important to note that the document includes no references to checks and balances between the branches, which is interesting considering what a dramatic increase in scale and power this act created in the Executive Branch. These lawmakers were not sure what to expect, but appear certain in their belief of the type of national security threats the nation would face: some sentient foe that actively sought to destroy the United States and the free world. As a result, drafters create a very narrow definition of national security, and design a structure meant to avoid wartime catastrophes. The National Security Council was established to serve as a wartime structure.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

In an effort to halt the spread of communism, the United States undertook the a number of military efforts that suffered from operational failures.³⁸ The objective was to overthrow communism, and although the island was small, the United States military devoted an incredible amount of resources to the failed operation. Many of the problems encountered involved miscommunications between various sectors of the military.³⁹

This deeply disturbed U.S. leaders, both in the military and the Senate, and the failed operation became highly politicized. Senators were caught off guard and realized that they had little power over the national security structures of the Executive branch. Once again, the issues were both logistical and theoretical in nature. They drafted the *Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986* to address these problems.

³⁷ *The National Security Act of 1947*.

³⁸ Charles Nemfakos et al., “The Perfect Storm,” 5-8.

³⁹ Ibid., 5.

The *Goldwater-Nichols Act* differed from the *National Security Act of 1947* in length. The original document is 86 pages long and defines a clearer DoD structure by adjusting the chain of command and establishing new positions.⁴⁰ Along with the restructuring of the Department of Defense, the drafters wanted to encourage more strategizing and contingency planning.⁴¹ They also sought to increase opportunities to exert Congressional oversight, and added a new responsibility for the National Security Council to produce and submit an annual strategy document.

This section aligns with the original text from 1947, referencing “worldwide interests, goals, and objectives.” The nature of national security threats is understood in the same way, as Congress requests to be informed on the national defense capabilities “necessary to deter aggression”—which implies that these threats are, again, sentient actors who seek to destroy the United States.

But Congress makes clearer to the Council that it must distinguish between short-term and long-term uses of its resources and requires it to produce “an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support implementation of the national security strategy.” These changes suggest an effort on part of Congress to shift national security prioritization in ways that it considers to be more strategic (and thus, less wasteful), balanced, and transparent. But mirroring the section of the National Security Act of 1947 that established the Council, this section is roughly a page long, suggesting that members of Congress may not have a clear idea of how to craft legislation regulating Council functions.

The roughly 200-page Congressional Conferee report reveals more information on intentions behind requiring the national security strategy. Originally, the national security strategy was intended as a responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, but drafters

⁴⁰ “Goldwater–Nichols Act.” *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 29 July 2020, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldwater%E2%80%93Nichols_Act.

⁴¹ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization act of 1986, H.R.3622 — 99th Congress (1985-1986).

feared this would overburden the military.⁴² This suggests that members of Congress viewed the functions of the military and National Security Council as interchangeable, again supporting the conclusion that military concerns are seen as indistinguishable from national security concerns.

2. Major National Security Doctrines

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823

Isolationism and unilateralism were set in the first approaches to foreign policy in the United States, and were forever enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. At the time, President James Monroe was developing a U.S. foreign policy stance towards foreign powers that sought to meddle in the Americas. By that time, the U.S. had been independent from Britain for roughly 50 years, and most other former colonies throughout the Americas had gained independence from their colonizers. But imperialist interests in Europe remained, and the U.S. government was convinced that efforts would by those foreign powers to encroach upon the Americas once more.

Monroe oscillated between making a joint declaration with Britain against foreign intervention in the Americas or following the general spirit of the U.S. founding philosophy and making a unilateral declaration. This was a question of practicality versus philosophy. While a joint declaration was more practical (the U.S. lacked the military and naval power to enforce a non-interventionist foreign policy stance alone), a unilateral declaration was more in line with avoiding foreign entanglements and remaining separate from European affairs. Monroe solicited advice from former presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who both supported a joint declaration. While Jefferson did agree that a unilateral declaration aligned best with U.S. founding principles, he thought that practicality should take priority. In a letter to Monroe, Jefferson wrote, “I am clearly of

⁴² Goldwater-Nichols Congressional Conference Report, Goldwater-Nichols Congressional Conference Report. H.R.3622 — 99th Congress (1985-1986): 161.

Mr. Canning's opinion, that [a joint declaration] will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war.”⁴³

But Monroe’s Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, argued vehemently against a joint declaration with the British. A main reason had to do with his belief in the manifest destiny and U.S. expansion across North America. Scholar on the Monroe Doctrine, Dexter Perkins, writes, “There is some evidence that, at a date much earlier than 1823, Adams had begun to think of the American continents, especially the North American, as a special preserve of the United States, from which the rest of the world ought to be excluded.”⁴⁴

Also, at that time the U.S. was dealing with the northwest question, which related to the joint U.S.-British occupation of the Oregon Territory and Russian land claims just above in most of what is now Alaska. A meeting between Adams and Canning, as recounted in Adams’ diary, reveals just how weary Adams was of British presence in the Americas. While discussing claims in the American northwest, Adams remarked to Canning in frustration, “I do not know what you claim nor what you do not claim. You claim India; you claim Africa; you claim—”⁴⁵ Canning retorted, asking where Britain’s rights to lay land claims should end, to which Adams replied “We know of no right that you have here.”⁴⁶

Thus, from Adams perspective, a unilateral declaration gave the United States a convenient national defense justification to threaten against foreign encroachment and pursue its own expansionist interests. Ultimately, Adams was more persuasive and the doctrine was both unilateral and isolationist. While formally establishing unilateralist and

⁴³ Thomas Jefferson, “To the President of the United States (James Monroe),” Monticello, October 24, 1823, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/thomas.htm>.

⁴⁴ Dexter Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, 9.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 10.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

isolationist foreign policy approach in line with the founding U.S. philosophies was the manifest functions of the doctrine, it also had important latent functions.

The reasoning behind it was paternalistic, and represents a clever and opportunistic strategic move. It characterized European colonialism as abusive, but distinguished it from similar U.S. activities in the Americas by suggesting that the U.S. could only act out of an altruistic interest in America civilization. This is clear with respect to U.S. enforcement of the doctrine, which was uneven. The U.S. made a careful, self-interested calculus on when to enforce the doctrine. Adams saw establishing these principles early on as doing a better service to the country than rigid enforcement.

The meaning of the Monroe Doctrine changed once the United States achieved “Great Power” status at the turn of the 20th century. President Theodore Roosevelt delivered the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904. With his corollary, Roosevelt gave the U.S. a more active role, claiming the right to exercise “international police powers” in order to protect the Americas from “chronic wrongdoing.”⁴⁷

The Truman Doctrine of 1947

The Truman Doctrine was delivered to Congress by President Truman on March 12th, 1947. He announced “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” His announcement is considered the official beginning of the Cold War, as it “outlined the broad parameters of U.S. Cold War foreign policy: the Soviet Union was the center of all communist activity and movements throughout the world; communism could attack through outside invasion or internal subversion; and the United States needed to provide

⁴⁷ Martin Kelly, “Top 6 Key U.S. Presidential Foreign Policy Doctrines,” ThoughtCo.com, <https://www.thoughtco.com/top-six-foreign-policy-doctrines-105473>.

military and economic assistance to protect nations from communist aggression.”⁴⁸

Communist movements in Greece and Turkey, which many, including Truman, believed were orchestrated by the Soviet Union, catalyzed the doctrine.

But some disagreed with Truman’s stance, noting that the insurgency in Greece was supported by Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia, and that there seemed to be a political division between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.⁴⁹ Still, “the Truman Doctrine successfully convinced many that the United States was locked in a life-or-death struggle with the Soviet Union, and it set the guidelines for over 40 years of U.S.-Soviet relations.”⁵⁰

The Reagan Doctrine of 1985

President Ronald Reagan insisted in 1985 that the United States must support its democratic allies who were risking their lives “on every continent... to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.”⁵¹

This talk of transitioning the Soviet Union away from communism and “engaging the Soviet Union in negotiations” was unrecognizable to Reagan’s foreign policy approach when he first acceded to the presidency in 1981. As promised during his campaign, he immediately sought to drastically decrease domestic spending and significantly increase defense spending, believing that the stronger the military the less chance of an attack on US interests.⁵² During those early days of his presidency, he felt that “aggressive anti-

⁴⁸ “President Truman Announces the Truman Doctrine,” *History.com*, A&E Television Networks, 13 Nov. 2009, www.history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-doctrine-is-announced.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Martin Kelly, “Top 6.”

⁵² Jeremi Suri, *The Impossible Presidency: the Rise and Fall of America's Highest Office*, Basic Books, 2017: 245.

communism, in particular, would protect the American-led capitalist system from infiltration and inspire more entrepreneurship.”⁵³

From his first days in office, he doggedly pursued firm anti-communist rhetoric. His stance was so strong that he even inspired fears at home that the United States would soon be engaged in direct military confrontations with the Soviet Union, and as a result he faced sharp criticism at home. As detailed by Dr. Jeremi Suri:

“Reagan took these criticisms seriously, particularly when they encouraged voters to view his tough rhetoric with alarm. He reiterated his pledge to pursue peace through negotiations in every speech, even ones where he called the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire.’”⁵⁴

His adherence to the good versus evil binary thinking, even as he was trying to soothe concerned Americans, demonstrates how pervasive the view was of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” and how firmly Reagan believed it.

Reagan also firmly believed that “American promises of freedom would attract more followers across the globe”⁵⁵ and firmly denounced the idea of a status quo that depended on the “permanent vulnerability of American territory,” and based on that perception he viewed the theories surrounding mutually assured destruction to be illusory.⁵⁶ But Reagan’s aggressive approach to fighting communism and projecting American power “did not bring peace, but just the opposite” according to Dr. Jeremi Suri.⁵⁷

Several events in 1983, which occurred as a direct result of Reagan’s U.S. foreign policies, appeared to make America less safe. They forced Reagan to reconsider his hardline approach, and his perspective. Previously, Reagan had kept a “more relaxed

⁵³ Ibid, 233.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 237.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 245.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 236.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 245.

routine,” but once a series of missteps and blunders arose, he was immediately “scattered and over-scheduled like his predecessors.”⁵⁸ Reagan’s narrative had offered him a sense of confidence and certainty—a sense of control. He was confident that he knew precisely what needed to be done in order to make the United States safer. But when the narrative began to crash down around him, he felt powerless and overwhelmed, and far more vulnerable in the chaotic environment he inhabited.

A major turning point was when Soviets shot down an airplane that had accidentally strayed into Soviet territory. Without information on precisely why this had happened, Reagan assumed that it had been an intentional attack and labeled it the “Korean airline massacre.”⁵⁹

He announced to the nation and the world that the Soviets had attacked the “moral precepts” of the good people of the world and described the event as an “act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations.”⁶⁰ Reagan’s assumption that the incident has been intentional was rooted in a preconceived view of the Soviet Union as evil. His understanding of the event was dramatically altered by incoming intelligence suggesting that the Soviet were genuinely expecting a nuclear attack from the U.S.:

“The military behaviors we have observed involve high military costs in terms of vulnerability of resources for the sake of improved national military power, or enhanced readiness at the price of consumer discontent, or enhanced readiness at the price of troop dissatisfaction. None of these are

⁵⁸ Ibid, 243.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 246.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 247.

trivial costs, adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of concern that is often not reflected in intelligence issuances.”⁶¹

This intelligence forced Reagan to question his “tough guy” routine. He wrote in his diary “I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h—l have they got that anyone would want.”⁶²

While Reagan previously believed that Soviet leaders were just as confident in their machinations to destroy the United States as he was in his perceived efforts to save it, in reality the Soviets were afraid of what they perceived as Reagan’s aggression. Upon realizing that, Reagan never referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” again, and worked to engage with Soviet leaders, even despite disapproval from the macro culture and especially “some of the most vocal Republicans [who] opposed any discussions with communists.”⁶³ The major shift brought on by what Reagan viewed as counterintuitive intelligence may suggest the need for a shift in how intelligence is collected and presented.

Deriving the Cultural DNA of the NSC:

Based on this information, here are the Espoused Values; Formal Philosophies; Identity and Images of Self; Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms; Shared Meanings of the US National Security Council:

Espoused Values:

⁶¹ Ibid, 248.

⁶² Ibid, 249.

⁶³ Ibid, 249 & 251.

- Self-determination
- Independence
- Balance
- Self-restraint
- Freedom
- Safety
- Secrecy/Privacy

Formal Philosophies:

- The Constitution as a sacred text
- Providing National Security at any cost
- The NSC as the ultimate protector of the American people and the free world
- Democracy is the only acceptable form of government
- The United States is the ultimate democracy

Identity and Images of Self:

- Protectors of the free world
- Protectors of the American people
- Supporters of Democracy and Self-Determination

Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms:

- Isolationism and non-intervention as the way of good
- Democracy as the only legitimate form of government
- Non-Democracy as a threat to global freedom
- Communism as an evil, surreptitious enemy

Shared Meanings:

- Stopping communism as the ultimate goal

There are a number of patterns that emerge from this case study. The NSC has a tendency to value unilateralism and privacy, and at several moments in its history NSC members have disregarded major national values like freedom, due process, and self-determination. This is rationalized as a necessary evil in ensuring safety for the American people. When it comes to national security, members tend to believe that the ends justify the means.

This was not the case prior to World War II. That is because the emergence of nuclear weapons and threatening non-democratic states drastically altered understanding of the national security threats that the US faced. The stakes implicit the term “national security” rose dramatically as US leaders became doubtful that non-interference could keep the US from becoming embroiled in devastating wars or affected by major catastrophes. That change was the catalyst for the creation of the NSC, and has been central to its values and functions ever since.

The most important takeaway from this chapter is that national security strategies are not, and at no time were, viewed by the Council as a tool for crafting national security strategies. But national security narratives are. Congress placed the annual strategy document requirement on the Council as a means of reigning in the Council’s disproportionately strong powers and improving transparency. Unfortunately, it did not appear to generate the desired effect, resulting in a precariously unbalanced state between the three branches of government.

The NSC was established to manage disorder, which required clearer chains of command and a more coordinated response to foreign policy matters. Believing that the US had little time to prepare before an imminent clash with a new foe, the Soviet Union,

legislators scrambled to make structural changes. In their hastiness, legislators behaved recklessly when they produced the National Security Act of 1947 because they established a body without adequate Congressional oversight and they gave it a task that it could never accomplish given its entropy pattern. The National Security Council was created in less than 1,000 words. The structures were vague and so were the functions. There was little room made for Congressional oversight or a thought to the consequences of that.

That void was filled with the act's unique language, which was drawn directly from realist theory and the assumptions it held on the nature of national security threats and how to manage them. Realism shifted the understanding of war from something that could be eliminated forever to something that would always be on the immediate horizon, drastically increasing a sense of reliance on robust armed forces. The President and National Security Council were empowered via their responsibility to direct those forces. Those attitudes live on within the NSC to this day.

But the NSC was also imbued with liberal attitudes. Mirroring values set down from the founding of the country, the National Security Council views non-democratic forms of government as a perpetual and inherent threat to the United States and the free world. It also maintains the belief that spreading democracy is a national security objective, and that the United States is capable of spreading democracy without exception. To fail, therefore, means that the failure must have occurred on an operational level.

Because of how national security threats are perceived, members of the NSC tend to believe that threats draw from the characteristics and identity of an actor, as opposed to the behaviors of an actor. For as long as the actor maintains certain combinations of characteristic, such as a communist or authoritarian government with a large economy and military, the NSC will remain suspicious of it. This makes all national security threats very abstract in nature, and very difficult to translate directly into concrete objectives.

Also the NSC, as well as the macroculture that created it, tends to perceive the nature of national security threats as more covert in nature. This perception was the basis for the Central Intelligence Agency, which is fundamentally different from the State Department in that it is designed to keep secrets and collect intelligence that will specifically focus on national security threats, as defined in the act. The ability to engage in more covert activities and collect sensitive information is clearly a central aspect of how U.S. leaders understood the national security apparatus to function moving forward.

One of the best examples of this is encapsulated in Suri's book, The Impossible Presidency, when he writes, "Without him fully realizing it, Reagan's strong beliefs empowered zealous staff members... Congress, the law, and other restraints looked like nuisances for an administration committed to getting big things done."⁶⁴ For members of the National Security Council, the pursuit of national security aims is sometimes so time-sensitive and so critical for survival that it supersedes central US values like transparency, democracy, rule of law, and balance of powers.

Ultimately, this series of cultural attributes has locked the NSC, its members, and the macroculture into a national security narrative that is difficult to escape. This narrative as it exists today is explored in more depth in a recent Arctic Institute article,⁶⁵ but here is the general one derived from the connotations of doctrines included in this analysis:

The Americas are spiritually and resource rich continents coveted by all, with North America as the spiritual center. The United States is endowed with special abilities as a result. It is predestined for good, representing the pinnacle of human morality. This places the US on top of a hierarchy above all other groups and sovereign entities in the Americas and the world. The greatest threat to US national security stems from powerful non-democracies, which are evil.

⁶⁴ Suri 257.

⁶⁵ Jacquelyn Chorush, "'Prepared to go Fully Kinetic.'"

While abusive foreign powers seek to involve themselves out of a selfish interest in rich American resources and colonialism, the United States is restrained by its inherent goodness. Any power that defies the doctrine and intervenes in the Western Hemisphere must have nefarious intentions, making it an inherent threat to US national security interests. To protect itself and the rest of the Western Hemisphere, the US must take defensive military action in order to drive it away.

This narrative reveals a paternalistic attitude towards the outside world, and an unfortunate consequence of that is leaders who rarely question their own assumptions about what they perceive as the primary national security threats and objectives. This narrative trap appears to have affected Truman and Reagan, who both fully believed that their respective foreign adversaries embodied an innate, total evil. Believing they knew best, they paid no mind to diplomatic tools or the value of dialogue. Truman was dismissive of facts that contradict his foreign policy narrative. Reagan rigidly follows his foreign policy narrative until, in a moment of chaos and extreme fear of nuclear war, he was receptive to information that ran contrary to that narrative.

But a major cultural change did occur during Reagan's presidency. When he could not escape the realization that his worldview towards the Soviet Union was flawed, he changed his behavior completely. He did this in spite of the public attitudes towards his shift because he valued his sense of integrity above the public's opinion of him. It is possible for the national security policy process to change on a dime if leaders are convinced to shed the narrative, but it rarely happens.

The Security Council of the Russian Federation

This chapter is about the internal sources of entropy for the National Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF). It begins with five sections (outlined below) and concludes with a synthesis of the important behavioral patterns that they suggest—the cultural DNA.

The pieces of legislation and analysis of Putin to be examined are:

1. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 1992
2. Federal Law on Security of 2010
3. Putin's Rise to Power 1999-2008
4. Putin's 2012 Doctrine
5. Putin's Leadership 2012-Present

I expect a close analysis of Putin's role in setting the course of Russian national security policy and his interactions with the Russian and international macroculture to reveal how the Security Council of the Russian Federation has interpreted its role at various important moments in the Russian Federation's history. I will identify any inconsistencies between within and amongst the content areas. From this, I will piece together whatever understanding emerges of the National Security Council's unique cultural DNA.

The content areas I will focus on in the final section are: Espoused Values; Formal Philosophies; Identity and Images of Self; Embedded Skills; Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms. I expect to find inconsistencies between within and amongst the content areas.

The final section pieces together a unique SCRF cultural DNA depicting a body charged with holding the fabric of society itself together, but condemned to do so by leveraging paradoxical forces of freedom and tyranny.

1. Legislation Defining the SCRF and its Duties

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, June 3rd 1992

The Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) was established by presidential decree on June 3rd, 1992. The preceding six months had been incredibly tumultuous. Boris Yeltsin had been one of the primary architects of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which occurred in late December of 1991. While Mikael Gorbachev, the USSR's final leader, had tried to reform yet preserve the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had "decided to abandon the [communist] party completely" and in early 1991 had rushed to Lithuania in a show of solidarity with independence movements there.⁶⁶

In a desperate attempt to preserve the USSR, the KGB, the defense minister, and the interior minister took Gorbachev hostage and attempted to reverse reforms, recentralize power, and prevent further efforts by the Soviet republics to separate. Yeltsin and his supporters were able to overthrow the coup, and from that point forward Yeltsin increasingly flouted Soviet law, including withholding taxes from the central budget, and decreed that the Russian Communist party would be suspended.⁶⁷

At that time, the country was in shambles. The almost overnight dissolution of the USSR resulted in a power vacuum that would not be fully resolved (on paper) until the enactment of the *Constitution of the Russian Federation* on December 25th of 1993, which formally ended the Soviet system of government. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse,

⁶⁶ Jonathan Steele, "Boris Yeltsin," *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media (23 Apr. 2007), www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/23/russia.guardianobituaries.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

citizens found themselves and their economy woefully underprepared to handle the monumental task of constructing an entirely new country from the ground up.

Much of that hardship was the direct result of Yeltsin's efforts to transition towards a freer society, beginning on January 2nd of 1992. Throughout the year, Yeltsin faced staunch opposition to his approach, especially from the legislature. During this time, Yeltsin feared he would lose his special powers of decree. Constitutional amendments that granted him those powers were set to expire at the end of the year and could only be extended by parliament.⁶⁸ Public support for Yeltsin also declined as inflation soared and the future of Russia looked increasingly bleak.

It was midway through that year, on June 3rd of 1992, that Yeltsin established the Security Council of the Russian Federation by presidential decree. Yeltsin's decree used the same 'указ' heading as those of the Russian Monarchs and Soviet Leaders who had preceded him,⁶⁹ and also had the same symbol of a hammer and sickle that had symbolized the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ Neither of these elements suggests a major shift in how Yeltsin planned to lead the new country.

Yeltsin's decree *On the Establishment of the Security Council of the Russian Federation* begins "Considering the constitution of the Russian Federation and Laws of the Russian Federation "On Security," I proclaim" and ends "the decree comes into force

⁶⁸ "1993 Russian Constitutional Crisis." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 21 July 2020, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Russian_constitutional_crisis#Origins.

⁶⁹ "ННГУ100 - Университет Лобачевского." *ННГУ*, 31 Mar. 2016, www.unn.ru/site/component/tags/tag/15-nngu100.

⁷⁰ "Soviet Ruble of 1958 Nears \$10,000." *Numismatic News*, 7 Dec. 2018, www.numismaticnews.net/article/soviet-ruble-of-1958-nears-10000.

at the time of signing.”⁷¹ Thus, Yeltsin used this decree to create an executive body outside the oversight from the legislative branch or any other government body.

The purposes of this Security Council were to “ensure the implementation of the president’s functions of managing the state, shaping domestic, foreign and military security policies, building up the state sovereignty of Russia, maintaining social and political stability in society, and protecting the rights and freedoms of citizens.” The primary activities were identified as 1) preparing the President’s annual review on state security and executive programs on domestic, foreign, and military policy, along with its development of legal acts to protect vital interests from “external and internal threats,” 2) creation of permanent and temporary commissions “as the main tool” for developing the president’s draft decisions, 3) ensure that these activities are within legal limits.

Federal Law on Security 2010

The Russian Federation’s *Federal Law on Security* was passed in 2010, when the Russian Federation was roughly ten years old. After President Vladimir Putin had stepped down following the conclusion of his second term in 2008, he was acceded by his Prime Minister, Dmitri Medvedev. Putin was immediately appointed Prime Minister and a series of new laws and amendments to the constitution were enacted. One of them was the 2010 *Federal Law on Security*.

There are reasons to suggest that these changes were made in anticipation of Putin once more running for president following the conclusion of Medvedev’s first term. 1) Putin’s rise to power suggests the continued political and economic influence of the Russian oligarchy following the fall of the Soviet Union, 2) Falling public support for

⁷¹ Борис Ельцин, “О порядке реализации решений Совета безопасности Российской Федерации (утратил силу на основании Указа Президента РФ от 06.05.2011 N 590),” Москва, Кремль (7 июля 1992 года), <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901606122>.

and fresh optimism for an enduring democratic state made the possibility of Putin seeking an illegal third consecutive presidential term risky, 3) the shift in state priorities suggested by the 2010 legislative changes suggests that the government was preparing for a new set of national security priorities, and that shift did in fact come once Putin secured the presidency in 2012.

The document reads like a table of contents. It covers a vast amount of ground but contains few specifics. It is a series of chapters and articles with numbered lists. Each number rarely exceeds a single sentence or phrase, meaning there is broad room for interpretation. It also contains vague terms, which are crucial for a clear interpretation of the document but which are never defined. For example, it authorizes the government to institute “special economic measures” and secure “dual-use and civilian equipment” without explaining specifically what those may be or what they may be used for.

The use of certain terms and phrasing also hints at the influences behind the text. According to the document, security activities include “the development and application of a set of operational and long-term measures to identify, prevent and eliminate security threats, and localization and neutralization of the sources of their manifestation.”⁷² This language reflects the language used by Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin, one of Putin’s favorites, who championed fascism and totalitarianism. According to Snyder, Ilyin borrowed from the Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt when he wrote that politics is “the art of identifying and neutralizing the enemy.”⁷³

Structurally, the law is interesting because it is roughly eight pages and contains four chapters, but only addresses the Security Council in chapter three. The first two chapters define security, arguing that the legitimacy of the document is drawn from the Constitution of 1993, and explaining the powers and duties of the president, the

⁷² Дмитрий Медвѣдев, “О безопасности,” Москва, Кремль (28 декабря 2010 года), <http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102144301&rdk=&backlink=1>.

⁷³ Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom*, Random House US (2019), 26.

Chambers of the Federal Assembly, the government generally, and the powers of federal executive bodies in the field of security.

While the law primarily addresses the powers and duties of federal and local government bodies, which must coordinate with the security council to ensure state security, there are a handful of references to the duties of citizens in ensuring state security. One of these references can be found in *Article 4. State Security Policy*, under which formal government bodies must work to satisfy the state security policy as determined by the president. But interestingly, there is also a requirement for self-policing within the general public. It is explicitly written in this section “citizens and public associations participate in the implementation of state security policy.”⁷⁴ Thus, citizen behavior is, according to the document, a legally enforceable component of state security.

Chapter 3 begins with Article 13, which defines the Security Council in four parts. The first part establishes the council as a “constitutional deliberative body” responsible for preparing the president’s security decisions. The second establishes that the council is “formed and headed” by the president, the third reads that the president approves the council’s regulations, and the fourth reads that the president may establish working bodies for implementation as he or she sees fit.

Two of the council’s main functions are legislative in nature. One is “consideration of draft legislative and other regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation on issues within the competence of the Security Council” and the other is “preparation of draft regulatory legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation on security issues and monitoring the activities of federal executive bodies in the field of security.”⁷⁵

While the President of the Russian Federation is identified as a member of the Security Council, there are several moments where the Security Council is described as

⁷⁴ Дмитрий Медведев, “О безопасности.”

⁷⁵ Ibid.

an entity independent of the President. The only reference to decision-making authority of the other members is number five in Article 15 *Composition of the Security Council*, which reads, “members of the Security Council participate in meetings of the Security Council with an advisory vote.” In this sense, the decision-making responsibilities belong to the president, and the more logistical and administrative duties are the responsibility of the council’s other members.

The fourth chapter nullifies nine preceding laws, enacted between 1992 and 2008, relating to national security.

2. Vladimir Putin

President Vladimir Putin has been a top decision-maker for all but eight of the Russian Federation’s twenty-nine year history. He is the dominant figure in Russian politics, and the central authority on all Russian policies. The Russian government structure is often described as “vertical,” and he is the man on top. Vladimir Putin emerged from complete obscurity when he was appointed as Yeltsin’s Prime Minister in 1999 and went on to serve as acting president.

He was elected president in 2000 by an overwhelming majority, and served two terms until he stepped down in 2008. He served as Prime Minister for the next four years, and was re-elected again in 2012. He has been president ever since. While he remains a mysterious figure to many, and his rise to power is just as obscure, there are important circumstances and details about him that can be enlightening in understanding his vision for Russia, and his thoughts on Russian national security. “Putin’s inner circle maintains close supervision over economic activities in multiple ways: this can occur via their

occupying government positions, but also by being board members of energy companies, as well as through family networks or informal schemes.”⁷⁶

The Rise of Russian President Vladimir Putin, 1999-2008

By 1999, Yeltsin and those nearest to him understood that the low public approval ratings, as well as Yeltsin’s deteriorating health, made it clear that Russia would soon have a new leader. The oligarchs who surrounded Yeltsin “wished to manage democracy” as they had managed economic privatization—in their favor.⁷⁷ But they were not sure what type of leader or characteristics would be most appealing to the general public. They organized a public opinion poll on “favorite heroes in popular entertainment.” Snyder recounts that the winner was a character by the name of Max Stierlitz: “a hero of a series of Soviet novels that were adapted into a number of films, most famously the television serial *Seventeen Moments of Spring* in 1973. The fictional Stierlitz was a Soviet plant in German military intelligence during the Second World War, a communist spy in Nazi uniform. Vladimir Putin, who had held a meaningless post in the East German provinces during his career in the KGB, was seen as the closest match to the fictional Stierlitz.”⁷⁸

Little is known of Putin’s life prior to this time, but it has been posited that “[a]s a former KGB officer, Putin was a Chekist, as Russians still say, who wished to rule Russia through the Russian Orthodox Church.”⁷⁹ Putin’s favorite film is “*The Sword and the*

⁷⁶ Marlène Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, Routledge, 2015, 8.

⁷⁷ Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom*, 26 & 43.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 44.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 58.

Shield,” a Soviet TV series glorifying the Cheka—an early Russian security service from which the Russian KGB was born.⁸⁰

An interesting series of events followed over the next few months. Yeltsin appointed Putin to the position of Prime Minister that August, but due to his obscurity, Putin’s approval rating stood at 2%. Less than one month later, on September 9th, a series of bombings broke out in Russian cities and Putin’s display of “righteous patriotism” in declaring the Second Chechen War boosted his approval ratings to 45% by November.⁸¹ Yeltsin resigned that December and endorsed Putin for president in the upcoming elections. This afforded the rising leader additional benefits from Yeltsin’s influence over the media and a manipulated electoral system—Putin received an absolute majority in the presidential election the following March.⁸²

The domestic fight against terrorism and increasing economic prosperity were hallmarks of Putin’s first two terms as president. As his crusade to protect Russia from the perceived subversive national security threats intensified, he abolished regional elected positions and made headway in consolidating power.⁸³ Russians also rallied around the rapidly strengthening economy, which grew at a rate of 7% annually between Putin’s first and second term.⁸⁴

During this time, Russia experienced warming relations with the West: Putin offered Russian support to NATO after the attacks of September 11th, spoke favorably about the possibility of EU membership for Ukraine, and was careful not to portray NATO as an adversary.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Christopher Andrew and V.N Mitrochin, *The Sword and the Shield: the Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, Basic Books, 2001.

⁸¹ Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom*, 26 & 45.

⁸² Ibid, 45.

⁸³ Ibid, 46.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 47.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

High public approval ratings for Putin and his political party, United Russia, would largely be undone by the global financial crisis of 2008.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2012 Doctrine

During his first address to the Russian parliament after his re-election in 2012, Putin described his return to Russian leadership as fate. He reminded the audience of medieval Russian history, when his namesake, Volodymyr, brought Christianity to the lands of current day Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, binding them to a single destiny undergirded by a common culture and religion. Since that moment in 988, Putin explained, Russian Orthodoxy has been a distinct component of this shared cultural heritage.⁸⁶

This statement formed a new course for Russian foreign policy. Putin placed a renewed emphasis on Russian borders as being defined by a shared zone of culture and history, as opposed to being defined by international law.⁸⁷ As Snyder puts it, “[s]uddenly, in 2012, Putin’s new doctrine challenged the very notion that Ukraine and Russia were legal equals who could sign a treaty.”⁸⁸ Putin’s new attitudes set the course for the invasion of Crimea and all that would happen after.

While Putin’s confidence makes it seem inevitable that Russia would continue down an increasingly authoritarian path, prior to the election of 2012, it appears only top Russian officials shared Putin’s confidence.

In December of 2011, Medvedev made clear that he and Putin intended to “switch jobs” come the 2012 election results.⁸⁹ Yet after the global crisis of 2008, there was little

⁸⁶ Ibid, 63 & 65.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 62.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 63.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 49.

public interest in Putin resuming the office because he, like Medvedev, could not produce a compelling vision for on how to achieve economic growth.⁹⁰

That fear was strongly felt during the parliamentary elections December of 2011. Elections results accorded 26% of the vote to Putin's party, United Russia. This was just enough to control parliament, but many questioned the results and made claims that uneven media coverage and physical and digital vote manipulation had been tools to subvert the democratic process.⁹¹ An estimated 50,000 protesters marched through Moscow on December 10th, and by December 24th, that number swelled to 80,000.⁹² Within a month, protests across Russia collectively became the "largest protests in the history of the Russian Federation."⁹³

But rapidly growing discontent and increased scrutiny of the Russian Federations electoral process did not seem to impact Putin's confidence. In an opinion piece published on January 23rd, 2012, Putin wrote to readers as their future president and set out his vision for the years to come.⁹⁴

Snyder explains that there was clear evidence the election had been rigged.⁹⁵ In response to criticism, Putin did not seem to disagree and Medvedev noted that throughout Russian history, all elections had been fraudulent.⁹⁶

But just brushing off the discontent was not enough to secure Putin's presidential term. And he could no longer use the threat of Chechen terrorists as he had in 1999 and 2000.⁹⁷ And so, by 2012, new narratives arose regarding the threat of Western decadence and efforts by the United States to undermine the Russian government.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 61.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 49.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 50.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 51 & 54.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

The Leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2012-Present

Fostering a shared sense of Russian identity became Putin's number one national security priority during his third term.

In December of 2013, he instructed his top officials to complete a reading list over their New Year's holidays.⁹⁹ Included on the list were works from some of Putin's favorite philosophers: Nikolai Berdaev, Vladimir Solovyov, and Ivan Ilyin. Officials were presented with copies of the books and sent on their way.¹⁰⁰

While most books on the list are considered highly popular Russian classics, Dr. Andrei Teslya, a professor who specializes in Russian conservatism, points out that Ivan Ilyin's text on fascism appears to stand out.¹⁰¹ According to Snyder, Ilyin was a firm believer that "the future, like the past, belonged to empires."¹⁰² Putin quotes books from the reading list from time to time, but his frequent references to Ilyin's philosophical views, as well as the effort he made to bring Ilyin's works back from obscurity suggest a very special role for this philosopher in Putin's mind.¹⁰³

Putin has also not been shy about the need to strengthen the influence of the Eastern Orthodoxy over Russian's daily lives. A renewed emphasis on religious devotion as protection from a threatening, immoral West became a pillar of his plan to revive Russian greatness. During this time, libel and insults to religious sensitivities were made criminal offenses, helping reinforce Putin's control over the media and protect the Orthodox

⁹⁹ Сурначева, Елизавета. "В Поисках Мудрости." *В Поисках Мудрости – Власть – Коммерсантъ*, Журнал "Коммерсантъ Власть" №2 От 20.01.2014, Стр. 22, 19 Jan. 2014, www.kommersant.ru/doc/2383840.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Timothy Snider, *The Road to Unfreedom*, 68.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 68.

public sphere.¹⁰⁴ Powers and funding to the FSB, Russia's domestic security service, were drastically increased, including a "broad authority to shoot without warning."¹⁰⁵

Organizations that received funding from abroad, including all international organizations, were required to register themselves as foreign agents.¹⁰⁶

By 2013, Putin had launched a full on assault of gay rights. Putin had publicly equated same-sex partnerships to Satanism, emphasized Russian masculinity of Russian men, and identified the West and the source of Russia's existential threats.¹⁰⁷ He had expanded the powers of the FSB to combat so-called "foreign agents" and "subversives," harkening back to centuries of perceived agents working to destroy Russia, and even renamed one organization after a top Cheka official.¹⁰⁸ These efforts, and others, rapidly consolidated power under Putin and his national security apparatus.

While the general sense of piety among the Russian people is unclear, there is a long history of religious identity as tied to national identity.¹⁰⁹ That sense of community, which Putin sought to use as a unifier of Russian identity in his third term, set to work rooting out non-Russian "others." By this time, the West had been identified as the single greatest national security threat to Russia. A number of changes were made to Russian laws and its national security apparatus in order to combat the threat of insurgency from what was then increasingly characterized as a decadent, nefarious West.

Putin placed increasing emphasis on Russian culture as fundamentally at odds with the West and Western values. According to Michel Elshaninoff, philosopher and expert on the writings of Fyodor Dostoevsky, who authored the book *In the Head of*

¹⁰⁴ Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom*, 56.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 52-54.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 56-57.

¹⁰⁹ "Религия и Национальная Принадлежность в Центральной и Восточной Европе," Edited by Алан Куперман et al., *Pew Research Center*, 10 May 2017, www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/05/CEUP-Overview-Russian-FOR-WEB.pdf, 5.

Vladimir Putin, concludes that the idea of imperialism and the justification for war are two pillars of Putin's ideology.¹¹⁰ Imperialism is the "common core of Sovietism, Ilyin's white imperialism and Leontyev's conservatism," and "Putin's concept does not justify an offensive war, but a defensive war, with the expectation that the West will not like the ideas of a strong Russia."¹¹¹

These ideas are broadly encapsulated by Eurasianist ideologies. Central to this ideology is the belief that the United States is Russia's greatest enemy and is "directly responsible for the collapse of the USSR and [will] not let up its pressure until Russia is completely crushed."¹¹² Evidence of this ideology in Putin's mind appear as early as his 2005 national address, when he described the fall of the USSR as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century," a sentiment supported by roughly 75 percent of Russians.¹¹³

Clearly, the roots of Putin's change of course were present from the beginning of his leadership in 2000, and existed long before the Russian Federation or the NSC came into being.

The SCRF Cultural DNA

Espoused Values:

- "Russianness"

¹¹⁰ Матей Широки, "Идейные Источники Владимира Путина, и Куда Он Клонит," *ИноСМИ.Ru*, 17 May 2016, inosmi.ru/politic/20160517/236556467.html.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Dugin Eurasianism: a window to the minds of the Russian elite or an intellectual ploy?" *Studies East European Thought*, 2007, 221.

¹¹³ Ibid, 219.

- Purity

Identity and Images of Self:

- Russia and Russians deserves better
- Russia should be a global power
- The Russian president is the NSC
- Putting it in writing makes it legitimate

Embedded Skills:

- Disinformation campaigns
- Electoral manipulation
- Plausible deniability
- Signaling ahead of time

Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms:

- Subversion by the West is the main national security threat
- Uprisings are threatening
- Autocracy is inevitable in Russia
- There can only be one Russian leader, and that leader rules for life so long as they are competent

What stands out most in this section is the “embedded skills” of the SCRF. Putin, in particular, seems highly attuned to what the people need and what bare minimum he must do to appease the general public. He knows that what unites Russians is a sense that they deserve better and that the country deserves to be a world power. He also seems to sense that there is a sense among Russians that it is inevitable that Russia will have an authoritarian leader.

From this, Putin seems to have realized that so long as he can deliver on the great power status, he will be able to stay in power. It is unclear what Russia would do if it

achieved Great Power status, or if the public interest in Putin would change once Russia achieved it. There is public support for a shared cultural zone, but Russia has avoided direct military confrontation with the US. It was still willing to invade Crimea, though, because it was in the shared cultural zone.

Putin's reading list, the emphasis on traditional Russian values, and anti-Western rhetoric suggests that the values of Russianness and purity are central to achieving his goals.

The Security Council's authority supersedes legislative and judicial branches. As written, the document contains legislative and judicial powers that relieve those branches from exercising any authority over it. There are several references to the document being legitimate because it draws its power from the constitution, as well as the assertion that the council is a "constitutional" body, which suggests that no judicial oversight could be warranted. The council is also responsible for drafting laws that pertain to security matters, which is generally considered a distinctly legislative function.

Something else striking is how well Putin signals what he is going to do and then he does it. This is important, because by signaling that something will happen and then following through, he strengthens his credibility in the eyes of his people. This means that if he says he is going to do something, he at least makes it appear that he has done it.

Judging from all of this, it is clear that the Russian Federation was never a democracy, even in its early days. Yeltsin saw to it that the oligarchs maintained control, and the NSC was created as a way to assure that. Putin took the role of the NSC to a new level, and transformed national security into a powerful tool.

Underlying this cultural DNA is an enduring narrative that Russia is the spiritual center of the shared Russian cultural zone. This cultural zone extends back into ancient times and as a result, Russia has sovereignty rights and special privileges in these areas. But over time, evil, abusive powers, particularly from the West, have chiseled away at Russian power, seeking at every turn to deprive it of the Great Power status that it

deserves. Only by restoring the moral purity and reverting back to earlier ways can Russians gain redemption and turn the tides.

The Arctic

This paper began with a question of how national security bodies make decisions and the hypothesis that through Edgar Schein's Model of Organizational Culture and Leadership, this paper could understand the US NSC and SCRF well enough to make national security predictions that are 1) accurate and 2) actionable/reasonable. The goal of this chapter is to see how well the derived understandings of NSC cultural DNA and SCRF cultural DNA align with NSC and SCRF behavior in the Arctic—i.e. how accurate they are.

This is a rough timeline of major NSC and SCRF policies/communications in the Arctic:

- 2000** — Putin begins centralization of power over the Russian Arctic
- 2001** — Russian Federation releases its first Arctic strategy
- 2007** — Arctic expedition plants a Russian flag at the North Pole
- 2008** — Russian Federation releases its second Arctic strategy
- 2009** — The United States releases its first Arctic strategy
- 2013** — The United States releases its second Arctic strategy
- 2017** — Secretary of State Pompeo delivers controversial Arctic Council speech

Although on the surface, these developments say very little, other than that the NSC significantly trailed the SCRF in prioritizing the Arctic as a national security focus, there is much more to say when looking at larger historical and macrocultural patterns that ultimately catalyzed increasing NSC and SCRF attention.

The SCRF cultural DNA suggests continuity in Putin's goal of attaining Great Power status in the Arctic, following queues from the Russian macroculture that date back to the

founding of the Russian Federation. This is in contrast to the common perception that Russian behavior in the Arctic was more peaceful and cordial up until Russian activities took on a new level of aggression in recent years.

While some might argue that the sentiments expressed in former President Barack Obama's 2013 Arctic Strategy and Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's Roviemeni Speech to the Arctic Council could not be more different, applying the US cultural DNA demonstrates that they contain the same national security narrative outlined in chapter three, but emphasize different aspects of it.

Applying the SCRF Cultural DNA

The vast economic potential in the Arctic presents Russia not only with the chance to strengthen its economy, in spite of Western sanctions, but also to improve its global image. With a stronger domestic economy will come enhanced internal stability. Once the Russian economy is strong and its people placated, Putin can invest more in such things as green energy, environmental protection, and enhanced international trade—efforts that can help Russia to take on the role of a powerful world leader, improving its soft power and international standing.

In the early days of the Russian Federation, separate Arctic municipalities were left to fend for themselves. They developed independent governance structures as funding stopped arriving.¹¹⁴ Yeltsin's policies towards the Arctic don't link up with the attitude of the Russian macroculture. During this time, the Russian public took a renewed interest in the history of Alaska, and it was marked by conspiracy theories about "the West's supposed desire to fragment Russia."¹¹⁵ According to interviews that Marlene Laruelle, an expert on Russia's Arctic policies, conducted with anonymous experts of Russia's legal claims on the Arctic in 2010, it is not only "so-called nationalist authors" that view the

¹¹⁴ Marlène Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, Routledge, 2015: 3.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 42.

sale of Alaska with disdain and regret, but also “high-ranking officials with links to Arctic questions.”¹¹⁶

In 1997, Yeltsin signed UNCLOS. As written by the *RIA News* article’s anonymous author, once the *UN Convention on Law of the Seas* was ratified by Russia in 1997, it “reduced our border” to the 200-mile economic zone and Russians lost their rights to the rest of the Arctic Ocean, which both Arctic and non-Arctic countries immediately began to claim.¹¹⁷

That same year, Alexander Dugin, a contemporary Russian philosopher, publishes *The Foundation of Russian Geopolitics*, which becomes known as the “Russian Manifest destiny. In it, he writes that the Russian Arctic is “the shortest distance from Russia to the US territory,” which makes it a critical national security priority.¹¹⁸ Dugin writes that the Arctic is the spiritual center of Russia.¹¹⁹

Shortly after winning the 2000 election, Putin undermined Arctic self-governance by diverting local Arctic tax revenues to Moscow.¹²⁰ From that point forward, the presidential administration and the Russian Security Council directly set Arctic policy.¹²¹ But the Arctic only gains traction as a national security interest in the early 2000s, despite a vague and unimplemented first Arctic strategy.¹²²

In 2007, a Russian expedition sets out to collect evidence in support of claims to a significant area of the North Pole. Confident in the data that they collect, the expedition plants a Russian flag on the Lermontov Ridge, an underwater mountain range below the

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 42.

¹¹⁷ “Российский Флаг Теперь Не Только На Северном Полюсе, Но и Под Ним,” *РИА Новости*, РИА Новости Россия, Москва, Зубовский Бульвар, 47 495 645-6601 <https://xn--c1acbl2abdlkablog.xn--p1ai/Awards/35360>, 7 June 2008, ria.ru/20070802/70219047.html.

¹¹⁸ Александр Дугин, “ОСНОВЫ ГЕОПОЛИТИКИ,” Москва, *Арктогея*, 2000, <http://arctogaia.com/public/osnovygeo/geop12.htm#2>.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Laurelle, 3.

¹²¹ Ibid., 6.

¹²² Ibid., 4.

North Pole. This gives the Russian people hope that the UN will “return what [Russians had] lost” upon ratifying UNCLOS.¹²³

Shortly thereafter, in 2008, the SCRF releases The Arctic Strategy of the Russian Federation through 2020. The Arctic Strategy of the Russian Federation through 2020, which was released in 2008, was far clearer in defining objectives and providing a roadmap for the Arctic than the first.¹²⁴ The 2008 strategy “mentions a multitude of non-traditional risks and the need for international cooperation among coastal countries, in particular in terms of search and rescue systems.”¹²⁵ It seems more in line with the history of Russo-US relations in the Arctic than the anti-Western sentiment expressed in the Kremlin’s general rhetoric.

Since then, evidence of much less cooperative behavior has come to light. Russians have always been touchy about the Svalbard Treaty, a treaty signed by the US, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden in 1920.¹²⁶ It determined that Svalbard, a strategically-located polar archipelago, was part of Norway. Ultimately, the USSR signed, but as written by the author, “the archipelago could once have become Russian” because Russian ancestors have been fishing there since the 16th century and archeologists have found evidence there of tradesmen from North Russia.¹²⁷

Non-Russian Arctic people have been the targets of Russian interference. For Finnish officials, fending off a Russian “hybrid war” of targeted disinformation campaigns “isn’t necessarily a new mission,” because ever since Finland declared independence from Russia in 1917, it was the target of “Kremlin-organized influence operations” throughout the Soviet years.¹²⁸

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Laurelle, 4.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁶ Киселёв, Дмитрий. “Как Россия Возвращается На Шпицберген.” *Vesti.ru*, www.vesti.ru/article/1269825.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Weinger, Mackenzie. “What Finland Can Teach the West About Countering Russia's Hybrid Threats.” *World Politics Review*, 13 Feb. 2018,

These attitudes of the Russian macroculture and national security decisions relating to Arctic land claims demonstrate Putin's ability to harness public support and take advantage of Russian feelings of mistreatment (SCRF's embedded skills).

Applying the NSC Cultural DNA

According to the NSC cultural DNA derived in the third chapter, the NSC would not have considered the Arctic a national security priority unless developments suggested potential future military threats from an ideological enemy. That moment could easily have been the planting of the Russian flag on the Lermontov Ridge.

The move would have immediately reminded US leaders of when they planted a flag on the moon during the "Space Race," as this move was symbolic of the ideological battle between the two countries during the Cold War. And it appears to have been. The first US Arctic Strategy was released in 2009, and based on the timeline appears to have been catalyzed by the developments during the preceding two years.

Further, the second US Arctic strategy, *National Strategy for the Arctic Region*, was released in 2013. It contains a comparison between Arctic development and construction of the international space station alludes to US-Soviet competition during the Cold War. The 2013 strategy document reads: "Just as a common spirit and shared vision of peaceful partnership led to the development of an international space station, we believe much can be achieved in the Arctic region through collaborative international efforts coordinated investments and public-private partnerships."¹²⁹

The comparison suggests an acknowledgment from Obama that competition could arise in the Arctic just as it had in the Space Race. It betrays the difference between

www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24178/what-finland-can-teach-the-west-about-countering-russia-s-hybrid-threats.

¹²⁹ National Strategy for the Arctic Region. 5 Oct. 2013.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf, 4.

manifest and latent functions in the NSC. While the NSC was created to uphold freedoms and other founding values, the interest of the NSC is minimizing the presence of threats in the Arctic. This catalyzes the appearance of elements of the enduring national security narrative.

In conceptualizing the region as a frontier, the NSC deprives Arctic indigenous populations of any sense of history or agency, ignoring thousands of years of history. This behavior reveals attitudes similar to those of the Manifest Destiny, and signals an appeal to the US macroculture. Thus, the NSC views the development of the Arctic in a purely national security sense, as a means to an end, and far less as an end in itself. In short, Arctic development as described in this document is more about asserting ideological supremacy.

Statements made by NSC members like Secretary of State Michael Pompeo reveal not only betray an arrogance and self-centeredness with regards to the Arctic, but also complete disregard for the cooperative tone in the Arctic, which has everything to do with the multilateral Arctic Council. During his opening speech at an Arctic Council meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland, Pompeo opened by sharing that he grew up about four minutes from Disneyland, which “claims to be the happiest place on Earth by trademark” so the Finnish people “have some work to do... get the trademark.”¹³⁰ This was intended as a joke, but it fell flat.

He then reminded the crowd that the United States and Finland have been “friends for an awfully long time” noting that they are celebrating 100 years of diplomatic relations.¹³¹ While this is true, it was a bit tone deaf to emphasize the 100 years marker without congratulating the Finnish people on their 100 years of independence. By what he chooses to mention and what he remains silent on, he creates the impression that the

¹³⁰ Michael Pompeo, “Looking North.”

¹³¹ Ibid.

United States sets the bar for achievement in the Arctic, and the achievements worth celebrating are defined in relation to the United States. It is not in line with the tone of equality and cooperation in the Arctic and is much more in line with the national security narrative that everything ties back to the United States.

Pompeo also warns attendees that Russia and China are turning the Arctic into an “arena for power and power competition” and are not following Arctic laws.¹³² His statements are far more in line with the national security narrative than with developments in the Arctic, and for this many attendees and observers criticized what they perceived as Pompeo’s aggression.¹³³

Less than favorable attitudes towards the United States remain as a result of NSC behaviors. In late January of 2020, the *High North News* published an article on “the silencing of Arctic cultures” by multiple actors, including the United States. Professor Kirsten Hastrup of the University of Copenhagen described US treatment of Greenland in the early 1950s, when the United States had 100 locals “forcefully removed” in order to construct a military base, which was central in establishing a front towards the USSR.¹³⁴ This decision suggests that at the very least during the 1950s, the NSC valued its desire to protect the US above protecting the freedoms and rights to self-determination of the area’s inhabitants.

In the process of constructing a nearby camp, a reactor was destroyed by the weight of the ice sheet it was under. The US abandoned the camp but never cleaned up

¹³² Michael Pompeo, “Looking North.”

¹³³ Jacquelyn A. Chorush, “‘Prepared to Go Fully Kinetic’: How U.S. Leaders Conceptualize China’s Threat to Arctic Security,” *The Arctic Institute*, 16 June 2020, www.thearcticinstitute.org/prepared-kinetic-us-leaders-conceptualize-china-threat-arctic-security/.

¹³⁴ Marc Jacobsen, “Responding to the Silencing of Arctic Cultures” *High North News*, 28 Jan. 2020, www.highnorthnews.com/en/responding-silencing-arctic-cultures.

the mess from the reactor, which to this day is described as a symbol of US hypocrisy and callous exploitation, or an “imperial brumation,” as put by Professor Hastrup.

Applying the model appears to reveal information that suits geopolitical developments in the Arctic. It also suggests that while many circumstances have evolved in the Arctic, both the US NSC and SCRF have continued to act in ways consistent with their respective cultural DNA.

Conclusion

This paper's goal was to make Arctic geopolitics more predictable by investigating the suitability of Edgar Schein's Model of Organizational Culture and Leadership for understanding how the United States National Security Council and Security Council of the Russian Federation produce national security policies.

Based on the understanding of NSC and SCRF cultural DNAs produced by the third and fourth chapters, respectively, and how well they appear to coincide with US and Russian Arctic national security policies, this paper concludes that Schein's model is capable of offering specific predictions on the Arctic.

Schein's model calls attention to sources of evidence, such as an organization's founding legislation, that would not traditionally be considered when researching Arctic geopolitics. Analyzing the founding legislation of both the NSC and SCRF in their respective historical contexts yields insights that would not have come up otherwise.

The utility of examining shifts and continuities in national security doctrines, something more commonplace in political science, is amplified by Schein's model, which encourages the identification of latent and manifest functions. This is useful in drawing distinctions between the organizational culture and the macroculture, which does quite a bit to explain major sources of hypocrisy. More than anything, the insights from both case studies suggest that both countries feel entitled to the Arctic, but for very different reasons.

The model suggests that both the NSC and SCRF have imperialistic tendencies and draw from narratives that extend back centuries. Those tendencies manifest differently because each council's respective conceptualization of national security is culture-specific. In that way, the past continues to have a major bearing on future decision-

making for both bodies. As a result, distinctive patterns of philosophies, values, and other attributes are visible in the Arctic policies of both organizations.

In order to grasp the NSC cultural DNA, one must recognize that ever since the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States has feared what it perceives as hostile, non-democratic countries. Schein's model, though, leads one to the suspicion that the source of fear has been misidentified. Unable to accept a reality where war and nuclear attacks would always be a possibility, the United States created the National Security Council on a faulty premise that the US can win preventative ideological wars.

From its founding, the NSC was imbued with that same mindset. What the NSC truly fears is a nuclear holocaust, which its members believe will ultimately result if non-democratic countries become too powerful. Everything the NSC does is an effort to project power and control, even when that means forcing the US's own democratic values to take a back seat.

In order to grasp the SCRF cultural DNA, on the other hand, one must recognize that Russia has a rich history extending back thousands of years. Both during imperial times and under the Soviet Union, Russia's reach extended much further. But for much of Russia's more recent history, it has been under the control of a number of controversial leaders. Russians see a legacy chipping away, and feel a pressure to confront painful histories while at the same time using those histories to create a shared sense of identity.

It was optimism in the new Russian Federation to set a new course that led Yeltsin to create the SCRF, he recognized that his goals as president were not in line with the general public's interest in a democracy and a capitalist market that benefitted all. The SCRF will do whatever it takes to strengthen itself as a country, even if that means playing to its imperialist past.

When it comes to the Arctic, the Russian Federation's Security Council sees opportunity while the US Security Council sees a growing threat. Russia's sovereignty claims in the Arctic are largely viewed as legitimate according to international law.

The United States NSC cannot see past the history of the Cold War and what it perceives as the encroachment of a hostile, non-democratic country.

But questions still remain of how capable the model is for creating those predictions and how accurate the predictions will be. So the next step is to make predictions below, using the insight garnered in this thesis to justify them:

Prediction 1. Alaska will become the target of Russian disinformation campaigns, with the parallel goals of driving a wedge between Alaskans and the US government and boosting the sense of a cultural connection to Russia.

The SCRF has a special talent for disinformation campaigns, and as a result uses targeted disinformation attacks as a means of fostering public discontent in strategic areas in Russia's shared cultural zone. Not only was this the first sign that Putin would invade Crimea, but it is also currently happening in Scandinavian countries like Finland, which Russia perceives as being connected to that shared cultural zone.

Because Putin's interest in the Arctic is about identity, economic power, and great power status, being able to deliver on these national security objectives is critical to his overall national security priority: to stay in power. These targeted disinformation campaigns have proven surprisingly effective. Because Russians see Alaska as rightfully part of the Russian Arctic, and because the United States had neglected Alaskan indigenous peoples and other Alaskan residents, Alaska is a prime target for Russian disinformation campaigns.

While the SCRF may at some point consider an invasion of Alaska, it may also seek to work through US democratic processes in the form of using disinformation campaigns to influence elections. This is particularly strategic because if Alaska secedes, the US will no longer be an Arctic state and lose most of its leverage in the region.

Prediction 2. Continued aggression towards Russia and China in the Arctic will help the two countries to gain influence in the Arctic, and result in the waning of US influence.

Most Arctic countries hold sacred the history of cooperation in the Arctic. That is why aggressive US stances towards Russia and China have not only been met with disapproval, but have also weakened US soft power in the Arctic. This behavior adds to other instances in the Arctic and elsewhere when the NSC did not live up to US values and gives the impression that the US is hypocritical. If the US national security threats in the Arctic deal largely with Russia and China gaining ideological influence in the Arctic, then this behavior is counterproductive.

Prediction 3. Russia will not initiate a military attack against the United States in the Arctic.

Contrary to what the NSC communicates explicitly, the fostering of anti-Western sentiment in Russia serves the latent function of reducing public discontent. A military confrontation would likely result in further economic penalties, either directly or indirectly, and this would not be in Putin's national security interests. Also, the Arctic is Putin's best chance of improving Russia's economic situation, as well as attaining great power status.

Since international law and sentiments of Arctic countries towards Russia are at least not heavily strained, Putin has every interest in not testing his luck by risking these favorable circumstances. Finally, if the Arctic is such a site of opportunity for Putin, why would he destroy it by launching a military attack that would inevitably escalate?

Suggested Improvements for Further Research

As for Schein's model, itself, it is clear that applying it to a national security apparatus is a monumental task that is far broader than the scope of this project. But based on what it helped to produce, this thesis concludes that it is worthwhile.

But there are some recommendations on undertaking such a project in the future. There are a number of specialties that should be brought together to do this: a geographer, historian, legal analyst, ethnographer, strategist, organizational communications expert and behavioral scientist, at the very least.

This study was also limited because I could not interact with individuals directly. Schein intended for consultants to directly observe their targets, but due to the nature of these secretive bodies, that is unlikely to ever be permitted. Also, I am already familiar with these institutions and with the discipline (so I already have assumptions and biases that color my thinking).

Since this research suggests that the US national security narrative has been detrimental to the NSC pursuit of national security aims, it is important to more clearly point out to policy makers the danger of relying too much on this narrative. Firmly pointing out its inconsistencies may be enough to change behavior amongst NSC members in the future.

I would need the predictions to be looked at by a national security professional to know whether they sound 1) reasonable and 2) actionable/realistic. It will also take time to see if any of these predictions come true.

But I recommend that others to follow up with similar evaluations of whether Edgar Schein's model is suitable for the Arctic.

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